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ABSTRACT 
A laboratory experimental methodology has been developing in 
economics in recent years. The nature of the methodology is to 
integrate clearly motivated but largely subjectively determined human 
decisions with the organizational features of markets. The article 
summarizes the nature of the incentive system and how market 
organization can be used as an independent variable. Initial basic 
research results that involved the asses sment of the effects of posted 
price organization demonstrated that the effect of the institution is 
to raise prices and lower market efficiency. The existence of such 
effects and the close proximity of the laboratory posted price 
institution and rate posting institution required by the government in 
several industries has led to a series of policy related experiments. 
The results have also led to more basic research efforts on seemingly 
unrelated topics. 
LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS IN ECONOMICS: 
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For several years laboratory experimental research in 
economics has been rapidly expanding. The number of papers published 
annually has increased from two or three in the 1960's to over 70. 
Laboratory experimental research in economics was being done at no 
more than one U. S. university at any given time in the early 1970's 
while over 20 universities are involved now. Major topics have 
expanded from one area of applied game theory (the oligopoly problem) 
to include almost every subfield of economics and some of the 
management sciences. Research that was purely basic a few years ago 
has already had policy applications. 
This article examines the experimental treatment of one topic 
that has been important to the increased interest in the methods: the 
implications of posted price institutions. The experimental 
methodology is explained first and then the nature of the results and 
the applications are summarized. 
Traditionally, economics has not enjoyed the benefits of an 
experi�ental methodology. Naturally occurring economic processes are 
so complex that complete experimental control with multiple 
replications defies the imagination. Yet, in spite of that seemingly 
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insurmountable obstacle, the methodological posture taken by 
experimentalists is straightforward. General theories intended for 
application in complex markets should be expected to work when applied 
to the simple special cases. Such theories that do not work in the 
special cases should be discarded or modified in light of the failure. 
In order to create the necessary simple special cases, significant 
financial incentives are used to create markets in which buying and 
selling take place and in which people actually keep the prof its they 
make, General theories about the development of prices and the 
pattern of trading and profits are tested, It is hoped that the 
experience gained from the operation of the simple markets will lead 
to a deeper understanding about the behavior of complex systems where 
experimental testing is impractical. The laboratory data help screen 
models that are ultimately to be applied to much more complicated 
situations. In this sense laboratory markets serve as an additional 
source of data about how the complicated world works. 
Much current research can be traced to two discoveries about 
the behavior of laboratory markets, The first discovery, which 
evolved from research in the late fifties and early sixties, was that 
a market equilibrium model could be used to predict and explain 
several important behavioral features of laboratory markets, One 
implication of the discovery and subsequent research is that reliable 
principles of market behavior exist, The second discovery was that 
the posted price form of market organization has an influence on both 
prices and market ef ficiency. This second discovery provides an 
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important empirical connection between market organization and 
performance. While connections between market organization and 
performance were demonstrated experimentally many years ago (!) , the 
posted price institution is different by virtue of its relationship to 
the tools that are used in market regulation and policy. 
THE CREATION OF A MARKET 
Substantial differences exist among laboratory markets, but 
similar procedures are used to create them all. Laboratory markets 
can differ by the number of people participating and the relative 
market shares of participants. Some markets are influenced by random 
events with information about those events differing across 
participants, while other markets have no uncertainties. Market 
organizations can differ as do the posted price markets and double 
oral auction markets discussed in the next section. In spite of many 
differences the basic approach is the same. 
Subjects are typically college students but experiments exist 
with subject pools that range from high school students to employed 
adults. On occasion an effort is made to use only subjects from some 
particular industry. The differences among subject pools have not 
been sufficient to motivate intensive testing of different subject 
pools, 
In simple experiments subjects are randomly partitioned into a 
set of buyers and a set of sellers. Instructions are read and 
subjects are either tested on the market rules and the financial 
incentives or given a practice session or both. The parameters on 
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economic models that predict market behavior are sensitive to the 
exact nature of incentives. While much latitude is left for 
subjectively determined individual decisions, care is taken to avoid 
incentives not precisely controlled by the experimenter. The 
commodity traded is never given a name, and references to specific 
commodities or markets are avoided. If subjects neglect the 
controlled incentives in order to act as they imagine they or someone 
else in some particular market might act, the control necessary for 
testing quantitative models is lost. 
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The diagram in Figure 1 identifies the nature of incentives 
and controls that are common across experiments. The incentives are 
profits that the subjects actually keep. Buyers in a market purchase 
units from sellers by paying real dollars for them. The buyer then 
resells units acquired in the market to the experimenter at the end of 
a trading period or trading day. The difference between what a buyer 
pays for units in the market and what the buyer receives when 
redeeming them with the experimenter are the profits that the buyer 
keeps for himself. This profit potential is the only reward or 
incentive that the buyer is given. In formal terms each buyer, i, is 
given a redemption value schedule, Ri (xi) .  This function identifies 
the &.rQ§.§. income the subject buyer will ·receive from the experimenter 
if the buyer acquires xi units in the market and can be called an 
"induced value" <.V. The net income that the buyer keeps for his own 
is the difference between Ri (xi) and what i paid to sellers when 
purchasing the units. The theory of competitive demand maintains that 
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the function Ri(xi) can be transformed into a new function, called the 
individual demand function <i>. 
(1) 
The function can be interpreted aa the quantity that i would purchase 
if facing a fixed price p at which any quantity desired can be 
obtained, Equation 1 ia a theoretical construction derived from 
theory aa applied to the incentives the subject ia known to have. 
Behavior could be something very different. 
Sellers are given coat schedules Cj(yj) that identify the 
amount that seller j must pay the experimenter should (a)he sell yj 
units to buyers. The profit actually kept by the seller ia the 
difference between the receipts the seller gets from selling units to 
the buyers and the cost of those units. The potential profit is the 
total incentive provided sellers, The idea ia also shown by Figure l, 
Application of the theory of competitive supply (f) yields individual 
supply functions, 
(2) 
The function (Eq. 2) can be interpreted as the quantity that i would 
sell if a constant market price p existed at which (s) he could sell 
any quantity desired, Again, the theoretical nature of Eq. 2 should 
be made clear. The function ia postulated before any behavior of 
subject j is observed. 
The law of supply and demand can now be applied. According to 
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the model market pric� Hill be that which equates market demand (the 
sum of individual demands) to market supply (the sum of individual 
supplies) .  
L Di (p)
buyer a 
[ ( 3) 
aellera 
A 
That ia, the solution to Eq. 3, p, ia the predicted equilibrium price, 
Market volume ia predicted to be the quantity \ 
b 
Di(�) .L uyers 
Efficiency of a market in a coat/benefit analysis sense is maximized 
by a pattern of trades that maximizes the total earnings of all 
participants. Market efficiency aa predicted by the model ia 100 
percent. 
The efficiency feature, while easy to understand from the 
theory, is nevertheless rather striking. According to the model the 
total earnings of participants will be maximized even though (i) each 
individual knows only his/her own incentive functions and not those of 
others; (ii) individual discussions about their incentive functions 
are precluded by the rules; and (iii) subjects know nothing of the 
theory and could probably not solve the relevant optimization problems 
even if all information was available to them. The theory suggests 
that the efficiency levels will be attained as a result of 
decentralized actions taken by individuals who are presumably acting 
on the basis of their own self-interest. The idea is a version of 
Adam Smith's invisible hand. 
The markets are open for a fixed period, Trading takes place 
and usually a number of contracts are made. The market is closed and 
FIGURE 1 
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profits are calculated. The market is then reopened for the next 
period with traders operating from the schedules relevant for that 
period. Frequently the schedules remain unchanged for a number of 
periods. The price patterns, income, and ef ficiency levels can be 
compared with those predicted by the model. 
MARKET ORGANIZATION 
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The model as outlined above makes no explicit reference to 
market organization. However, from its inception, the theory has been 
constantly evolving to capture the potential importance of 
organization. Host people are unaware of the many different types of 
market organization. For example, in the United States people are 
familiar with the English auction in which prices are bid up and the 
item is awarded to the last (highest) bidder at a price equal to 
his/her bid. By contrast, the Dutch flower auction is almost the 
inverse. A "price clock" is initially set at a very high price. The 
price falls with the hand of the "clock" until someone stops the 
descent. The item is sold at the price indicated on the clock to the 
person who stops the clock. Sealed bid auctions are yet another 
common type of market. Bids are usually tendered privately and opened 
simultaneously, but the method of determining price differs according 
to the market organization. According to the first-price auction, the 
item goes to the highest bidder at the price bid. By contrast, in a 
second-price auction the high bidder is awarded the item, but the 
price paid by the high bidder is the price bid by the second highest 
bidder and not the highest bid. 
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The list of alternative types of markets is long. When faced 
with such alternative ways to organize a market, which should be 
chosen? What difference does it make in terms of prices and 
efficiency? Questions such as these motivate experimental research. 
THE ORAL DOUBLE AUCTION AND POSTED PRICES 
8 
The two types of market organization to be discussed here are 
the oral double auction.and the posted price institution. In the oral 
double auction both sides are active. Buyers verbally tender bids to 
buy one unit of the commodity, and sellers verbally tender offers to 
sell. The outstanding (last) bid to buy and offer to sell are 
publicly displayed for all to see. At any time a buyer is free to 
make a higher_ bid, thereby replacing the outstanding bid with a new 
(higher) bid, or to accept the outstanding offer to sell. Similarly, 
any seller is free to tender a lower offer than the outstanding offer 
or accept the outstanding bid, If the outstanding bid or offer is 
accepted, the person who tendered the bid/offer and the person 
accepting have a binding contract at the specified price for one unit. 
After a contract the floor is open for new bids and of fers of any 
amount. The dynamics of the market are characterized by many bids and 
offers converging to a formal contract. Contract prices normally 
differ from unit to unit. 
The oral double auction market experiments are usually 
characterized by lots of activity as subjects yell their bids or 
offers to the auctioneer. The role of the auctioneer is to record the 
outstanding bids or offers on the chalkboard where they remain until 
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accepted or replaced by better bids or of fers from other subjects. 
Recent computeriziation of this type of market has removed much of the 
noise but the fast pace remains. 
The posted price institution has more similarities with a rate 
bureau than an auction. The market is not so filled with activity as 
is the oral double auction, In a posted offer (as opposed to posted 
bid) market each seller submits a price, presumably in a sealed bid 
fashion without benefit of consultation with other sellers. All 
prices are publicly posted, typically on a chalkboard, and cannot be 
changed by the seller for some fixed period. Buyers first approach 
the lowest priced seller who can sell only at the posted price and who 
sells units until (s)he wishes to sell no more at that price. As the 
low price sellers "stock out, " buyers then move to the higher priced 
sellers. Since buyers will seek the low price advantages of the first 
buyer, a random device is usually applied to determine orderly access. 
After all buyers have had an opportunity to purchase, the period ends 
and sellers make decisions about the next period prices. 
The results of two experimental oral double auctions markets 
are shown in the top panel of Figure 2, and the results of two 
experimental posted offer markets are shown in the bottom panel. Each 
market consisted of four buyers and four sellers. The graph in the 
left of the figure is the market demand and supply model constructed 
from the parameters. The parameters of all markets were the same but 
the participants differed. In the top panel the average price during 
the first period of the two oral double auction markets is shown as 
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the first dot and the average price during the second period is shown 
as the second dot. The price range during the period is the shaded 
area, etc. Similar data are shown for two posted offer markets in the 
lower panel. The results of these markets are typical of data that 
have been generated by many replications. Many different types of 
subjects have been used ranging from high school students to employed 
adults. 
Each market consisted of a series of market periods or trading 
days. Each period lasted for about five minutes during which trading 
took place, After the period profits were calculated, the experience 
was then replicated with each participant facing exactly the same 
incentives as in the beginning of the first period. Each market 
lasted for about ten periods, 
MARKET PERFORMANCE 
Two aspects of market behavior are of interest. First, with 
repetition under fixed conditions the market prices are near those 
predicted by the model, and ef ficiencies approach the 90 to 100 
percent levels. Secondly, prices tend to be higher for posted price 
markets than for oral double auctions (about ten cents higher in these 
markets) and efficiencies are lower. Compare the efficiencies in the 
low 90's for the posted price with the 100 percent efficiencies of the 
oral double auction. 
The implications of the first aspect, the equilibrating 
property, should be emphasized. As can be seen from the figures, the 
simple demand and supply model works reasonably well under both 
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institutions, in the sense that other widely held beliefs can be 
dismissed in favor of this model. For example, a strictly held labor 
theory of value can be dismissed as being applicable to these markets. 
Labor had nothing at all to do with the development of prices so price 
formation in these markets is governed by completely different 
principles. Particular personality or other psychological 
characteristics do not seem to be necessary for the price convergence 
except to the extent that they are operative in allowing people to 
function, read the instructions, calculate profits, etc. Collusion 
does not automatically develop among sellers even though a harmony of 
interests in keeping price high is immediately apparent to all. 
Experiments have been conducted with a large and variable subject pool 
that has substantial differences in age, ethnic background, etc. 
Major subject pool differences have not been detected to date. 
The key to the price formation process is captured by the 
simple theory of demand and supply, but generalizations should be 
offered with caution. Complicated naturally occurring markets can be 
characterized by a host of features that were not present in the 
laboratory markets. As such features become recognized the stage is 
set for new experiments that determine their effects. 
The second aspect of the markets reported in Figure 2 serve to 
emphasize the cautionary note. The posted price institution induces 
an upward pressure on prices. It also has a downward pressure on 
efficiencies even though it is not readily apparent in those 
particular markets. This result signals a potential delicacy about 
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market performance by noting how it can be influenced by subtle 
features of market organization. 
The relative effect of the posted prices was first 
demonstrated by Plott and Smith (�) by comparison experiments. The 
phenomenon had actually been observed earlier by Williams (�) who 
thought it was due to the fact that individuals could trade multiple 
units. Cook and Veendorp (1) also observed the phenomenon and 
12 
attributed it to asymmetries in information. Even now no theory about 
the influence of the posted price institution has been published, but 
the effect has persisted under a variety of parametric situations. 
Extensive replications can be found in Ketcham et al. Ci). Markets 
with speculators were investigated by Hoffman and Plott (�). Markets 
with a relatively large number of sellers were studied by Hong and 
Plott (lQ). Mestelman et al. (!l) studied markets in which sellers 
acquired and paid for units prior to sale. A variety of demand and 
supply configurations and asymmetries were studied by Davis and 
Williams (!1.). The higher prices and lower ef ficiencies of posted 
price markets, relative to the oral double auctions, have held up so 
far. 
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
What began as an interesting basio research result stimulated 
other research questions and also found its way into policy 
applications. Figure 3 is a flow chart of the research and 
applications that have followed from the initial posted price study by 
Plott and Smith. The first set of applications led to an 
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The Connections among Research Topics 
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understanding of the posted price institution as a facilitating device 
that helped one side of a market gain an advantage over the other. A 
second line of investigation was stimulated by the recognition that 
the institution might be used as a means of control of monopoly, That 
is, the posted 1l!Q institution might be used as a decentralized method 
that helps one side (customers) overcome an inherent advantage of the 
other side (a monopoly). A third line of investigation that developed 
from the other two, rested on the recognition that the institution 
helps overcome a classic problem in public finance, the free rider 
problem. These developments will be outlined in the next section. 
Finally, a recognition that the posted price institution has such an 
independent effect on behavior has led to a reinterpretation of many 
experiments conducted in the 1960's (!1). 
APPLICATIONS 
Soon after the discovery of the posted price phenomenon, the 
Department of Transportation became concerned about a proposal to 
require freight rate posting for dry bulk, inland-water barge traffic, 
The railroads, which compete with the barges for dry bulk traf fic, 
claimed that freight rate posting would improve performance of the 
barge industry. Sellers would be free to post whatever prices desired 
with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Such price postings would be 
publicly available and would dictate the terms ot all sales. Any 
seller would be free to change its price if the ICC received a 
thirty-day advance notice. The railroads argued that public 
information on prices would make prices more competitive and protect 
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small barge owners from large barge owners who were allegedly making 
secret price concessions. The Hong and Plott study was first 
commissioned to study the claims of the railroads, A laboratory 
industry was created that reflected the prominent statistics for an 
appropriate section of the Mississippi River, Demand elasticities, 
supply elasticities, relative market sizes of buyers and sellers, 
demand shifts, etc. , were those of the industry. The absolute market 
sizes and the time frame were scaled down dramatically to accommodate 
existing laboratory technology. Experiments were conducted with the 
posted price institution as proposed by the railroads, and also with a 
market organization (privately negotiated prices) that is similar to 
the organization that had naturally evolved. 
The results of these experiments were the opposite of those 
that would be predicted by the railroad industry's analysis. Contrary 
to the railroads' claims, the posted price institutions caused prices 
to go up, efficiency to go down, and the small participants to be 
disadvantaged. The implications of the experimental results were to 
raise questions about the railroad industry's analysis and to place a 
burden on those who advocated price posting to explain why the policy 
they were proposing had such deleterious effects when examined under 
laboratory conditions. The proposal was dropped, 
The posted price research was used again in 1979. The air­
freight forwarding industry posted prices with the Civil Aeronautics 
Board in a manner similar to that which had been proposed for the 
barge industry. After deregulation the CAB was forced to decide about 
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how the industry was to be organized in the future, Citing the 
experimental literature on the effects of posted prices, the CAB 
issued a notice of proposed rule making calling for the abolition of 
the posted price institution. After having reviewed the response, the 
CAB eliminated all aspects of rate posting. Clearly the experimental 
work did not provide a scientific basis for a decision about the 
organization of the industry. However, the experimental results did 
provide the only source of background data about the potential effects 
of a policy decision and a presumption about what those effects might 
be. 
The importance of posted price research took on a new 
dimension when the Federal Trade Commission noticed a possible 
relationship between posted prices and certain industrial practices 
that had evolved in the lead-based, antiknock compound industry. The 
FTC brought action against Ethyl Corporation, E. I. DuPont, Nalco 
Chemical Company, and PPG Industries for four practices that existed 
in the industry, The individual contracts of these sellers contained 
language that obliged sellers to 1) absorb all transportation costs; 
2) meet the lowest price of any competitor or release buyer from any 
obligations; 3) deliver to buyer at the lowest price received by any 
other buyer; 4) provide buyer with a thirty-day advance notice of any 
price change, 
One theory of these practices, which is consistent with the 
FTC complaint, holds that provisions 1 and 3 operate to eliminate 
secret price concessions similar to the way rate posting might do. 
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Condition 2 operates to reduce the incentive to lower price by 
assuring that price decreases are met immediately by competitors. 
Condition 4 operates as a vehicle to coordinate price increases 
through a policy of announcing a price increase in advance of the 
thirty-day deadline. The price increase is thereby made contingent 
upon a favorable competitor's response before the deadline, The net 
effect of all these practices according to the government's theory, 
would be to raise prices above the demand and supply equilibrium as 
defined above in the earlier section. 
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The defense advanced a competing theory. Two sellers of about 
equal size aooounted for approximately 70 percent of industrial sales; 
the other two sellers were of about equal size. With such a high 
degree of concentration and the existence of excess capacity, sellers 
realized that price decreases would stimulate a competitive response. 
Sellers anticipating this reaction would keep prices high, Industrial 
structure would account for high prices and profits, according to this 
theory, and not the practices as claimed by the FTC so the relief 
sought by the FTC would have no effect. 
Experimentation was of interest to the FTC in the context of 
possible rebuttal evidence. Ia it true that industries with structure 
and concentration like those of the lead-baaed, antiknock compound 
industry, will necessarily maintain prices so high that the practices 
will have no room for an ef fect? The experiments reported in Grether 
and Plott (l.4) were designed to answer that question. Many market
experiments were conducted with laboratory industries that had the 
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same concentration measures and numbers of participants as the 
industry. Demand and cost elasticities were the same as those thought 
to characterize the industry. Of course the actual magnitude of 
prices and costs were scaled down to manageable numbers for the 
laboratory. Figure 4 contains the results of one market that operated 
without practices for several periods, then operated with the 
practices for four periods, and then with practices removed operated 
for an additional three periods. The results are typical of the 
experimental results from several replications that the collective 
effect of all practices is to increase prices. The magnitude of the 
effect depends upon the baseline practices that one hypothesizes would 
exist should the FTC have won the case. The claim of the defendants 
that concentration alone, unaided by practices, unnecessarily fosters 
collusionlike prices is incorrect. 
The nature of the contribution of experimental methods should 
be made clear. All interesting questions have not been answered, and 
some of the most interesting might not be answerable with experiments. 
The question addressed in the Ethyl experiment was: is the general 
theory offered by the defendants reliable? That question, which is 
the content of rebuttal testimony, is answerable experimentally, The 
question not asked was: do the practices make a difference in the 
lead-based, antiknock compound industry? The latter question was the 
one posed for the court and could probably not be approached 
experimentally, The first question is only one step in answering the 
second. The data were not introduced as rebuttal testimony so the 
Charles R. Plott 18 
treatment by the court has not yet been tested (!_1). 
The recognition that posted prices constitute a facilitating 
device has stimulated a basic research effort as opposed to an applied 
research effort. If posted offers tend to raise prices, perhaps 
posted bids by buyers could be used to lower prices when buyers face a 
monopoly seller. The flip side of a facilitating practice m ight be a 
tool for control. It just depends upon whom one wants controlled. 
This observation by Smith (lf) led him to ask a more general question. 
Can institutions and organizations be used to control monopoly 
pricing? 
Figure S shows the results of two of Smith's experiments. 
Both markets have only a single, monopoly seller. When the monopolist 
must use the oral double auction, prices tend to be lower than when 
monopolists use posted prices. Such results demonstrate the 
reasonableness of Smith's question and suggest that the answer is yes. 
The Smith research was the first to initiate a laboratory 
study of monopoly, The results, that the classical monopoly model was 
not always reliable and that the reliability depended upon market 
organization, set the stage for a series of additional studies of 
monopoly, The most prominent are those that focus on "contestabili ty 
theory. " 
The theory of contestable markets grew from an attempt to find 
alternatives to the traditional administrative rate setting process of 
regulating monopolies (11). Competition has traditionally been
regarded to be unworkable in certain types of industries in which 
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costs continue to fall with volume. The basic idea of conteatability 
theory is that potential entry together with an organized method of 
facilitating entry can effectively maintain prices below monopoly 
levels even though a single seller necessarily exists. No politicized 
rate setting process would be necessary. In effect, sellers post 
prices and the seller with the lowest posted price supplies the whole 
market. Because of the importance and complexity of monopoly 
regulation, the theory has been a subject of substantial interest. 
The role of experimental economics has been to supply data 
where no other source of data exists. Marketa purposefully organized 
along the lines suggested by contestability theory do not exist, and 
firms in monopolized markets are not likely to offer their markets as 
field experiments, Relative to the coat of field experiments the cost 
of laboratory experimentation is nothing, even with highly rewarded 
adults as subjects. The cost of a field experiment would be measured 
in tens of millions of dollars as opposed to thousands. The 
laboratory methods are also forgiving in the sense that many 
alternative ideas can be probed and "debugged" prior to any large 
data-gathering effort. The first experiments with contestable markets 
(!.!) provided clear evidence that the theory could work. Subsequent 
basic research (19) has centered on special cases for which competing 
theories suggest that contestability theory will not work. Those 
basic research efforts have led to modifications of the theory and to 
a deeper understanding of the type of actual market organizations that 
help the theory work. The experimental work and organizational 
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suggestions found in that research formed the basis of a method of 
awarding monopolized international airline routes (1Q) . Such routes 
are monopolies by virtue of bilateral agreements with other countries, 
and the problem is to deoide which carrier gets the right to operate 
on the route. 
The third line of investigation that was stimulated by posted 
price research takes a surprising turn toward issues in a different 
area in economics--public finance, The connections with this new line 
begin with a result that demonstrates the difficulty experienced by 
market conspiracies when operating in an oral double auction. In an 
oral double auction conspiracies are not especially effective. In 
view of Smith's results on the difficulties faced by a monopolist 
operating in such markets, it is not really surprising that a group 
attempting to behave like a monopolist would also have troubles. 
Isaac et al. (�) investigated the behavior of conspiracies when the 
market was organized as a posted offer as opposed to the oral double 
auction. The results demonstrate that under the posted offer 
institution conspiracies tend to be successful. The posted offer 
institution together with conspiracy is an effective way to maintain 
high prices. 
In the eyes of a theoretician the problem faced by 
conspirators is similar to the problem faced by the public in the 
areas of pollution, environmental degradation, defense, and other 
common efforts (public goods) .  Oligopolists have a common interest in 
maintaining high prices. The problem is that each seller would prefer 
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that other sellers contribute to their "common good" by maintaining 
high prices while the seller in question charges a slightly lower 
price and captures as much of the market as is desired. Each seller 
has the same motivation to "free ride" on the decisions of others. 
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The net result is that without facilitating practices, the "common 
good" is not easily attained. Similarly, in the case of environmental 
degradation, each individual has an incentive to allow others to carry 
the burden of a common goal of cleaning up the environment and the 
expense of "proper" effluence disposal. By "free riding" on the 
efforts of others the individual sees an opportunity to enjoy the 
benefits of the common goal while not accruing any of the costs. Each 
individual is in the same strategic position and, as a result, common 
purposes frequently do not get accomplished. The problem is well 
documented experimentally. Even when people are fully cognizant of 
the problem the collective goods tend not to be supplied. 
If conspiracy and the facilitating practice of posted prices 
can help solve the free riding problem faced by conspirators, perhaps 
similar organization might help solve the free rider problem in other 
areas of collective action. The observation led Isaac and Walker (22) 
to study a process that combined a public meeting in which face-to­
face conversations could take place together with a method of making 
nonbinding a private commitment to contribute toward a common goal. 
In the technical jargon they studied this "combined" mechanism as a 
means of financing a public good. 
The results are promising in that the mechanism has greater 
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efficiency properties than any studied to date. For decades the free 
rider problem was believed to have no solution at all--in principle. 
For centuries arguments similar to modern theories have used free 
rider arguments to justify the coercive and taxing powers of 
government. The phenomenon has deep philosophical roots and is at the 
foundation of many theories of government. From a basic research and 
theoretical perspective, the results of Isaac and Walker will force a 
reconsideration of some widely held beliefs. 
CLOSING REMARKS 
Studies of the posted price institution demonstrate how basic 
research motivated by scientific curiosity can lead to many 
unanticipated applications. Posted prices tend to induce price 
contracts above the competitive equilibrium and also tend to induce 
market inefficiencies, The implications are direct for rate-posting 
regulatory arrangements. Indirectly the phenomenon has implications 
for antitrust and for theories of facilitating practices. The 
indirect consequences have also stimulated further experimental work 
on the public goods problem in public finance and political science. 
Perhaps moat importantly the research demonstrates that laboratory 
experimental methods can be used in economics for basic, applied, and 
policy research. Such a demonstration presents a real challenge to 
the commonly held belief that as a matter of principle economics is 
not a laboratory science. 
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